government debt. It is first shown that the transfer can make the welfare change in the same direction in both of the countries, and that this possibility cannot be ruled out by stability condition. It is also shown that for all transfers the short run and the long run welfare effects; may be qualitatively different. The only form of transfer that in the long run surely increases welfare in the country receiving the transfer is the tax-financed debt-relief. But in the short run it will reduce the welfare in all countries. There exists thus a trade-off between short and long run welfare, since all other forms of transfers quarantee a short run welfare improvement for the receiving country.
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I INTRODUCTION
One of the classical problems of the political economy is the problem of the burden of the national debt. The question is about the effects of current borrowing of the government on the well-being of current and future generations. The debt is regarded as a transfer of income from future generations to those who are alive now. A classical problem in the international political economy is the transfer problem: how does a transfer of income from one country to another affect the world equilibrium and the well-being in both of the countries?
In this essay I shall study these two problems jointly. I shall ask what the intertemporal effects of international transfers are. One motivation for my choice springs from the current problems facing developing countries.
Much of the development aid has the characteristics of an income transfer.
Similarly, many of the proposals to overcome the debt problem of the LDC' s contain elements of transfers (e.g. those, which include a (at least partial) writing-off of the debt). Hence, one may ask, whether the transfer should be made in the form of a transfer of income, or in the form of a debt relief. Due to the importance of government debt in the LDC debt, I consider the deb'; relief in the form of a transfer of income to the government. The income transfer is a transfer of income to the citizens of the debtor countries. The second motivation for my study springs from the current lively debate concerning the proper level of public debt in DC's. It is thus natural to ask whether the transfer (in which ever form it is made) should be financed by issuing new debt, or by increasing taxation in the transfering country.
These issues can be studied in a compact form in the overlapping generations model. But for a meaningful study I need a framework, where the form of financing government revenue matters. Thus, I cannot use the framework adopted by Barro (1974) . Instead, I can use the version of the OLG-model developed by Diamond (1965) , which has been extended to allow for both private and public external borrowing. These extensions are due to Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985) . In the next section I shall present the model. Thereafter, I proceed to study the effects of the possible transfers (i.e. of tax-financed debt reliefs, and debt-financed income transfers). Kemp and Kojima (1985) have studied similar issues using the ordinary static trade theory. They show that if the transfers are "tied" in the sense that they are either financed or spent inefficiently), then the effects of the transfers may be perverse. My analysis extends these considerations to a dynamic framework.
II THE MODEL
The world consists of two countries, a debtor nation and a creditor * nation. The variables referring to the latter are marked by a -superscript.
First consider the debtor nation. At each period it is populated by citizens from two generations, one born and working in the current period and the other born in the previous period and retired in the current period. The population growth rate is (l+n)>l. The income of the young is the net wage income from current production. They allocate it to current consumption and to savings. The income of the old is determined by their savings. The old spend all their income (a generation lives two periods). The budget constraint facing the currently (period t) representative young (all members of all generations are assumed to be identical) is:
(1) c + c. _/(l+r ) = w , t t+1 t+1 t '
where ct = current period consumption of the youngster, ct+1 = consumption in the next period, rt+1 = real rate of return on savings made in period t, and wt = net wage income. Maximization of the lifetime utility u(ct,ct+1 ) (which is assumed to have all the standard properties) gives the current consumption and the saving as ct = c(wt,rt+1, ), st = s(wt,rt+1 ). The next period consumption is ct+1 = (1+rt+1)st. The properties of the saving function are assumed to be the following: sr >0 and 0<s <1 (which holds if consumption in both periods is a normal good). Finally, the optimum choices yield the indirect utility function, ut = u(ct ,ct+1 ) = V[w ,l/(l+rt+1 )] = V(wt,rt+1), with V ,V >0. The savings can be invested either in prysical capital K, in government bonds (G and G ) or in net borrowing from abroad (H, with H>0 indicating that borrowing exceeds lending). All these three forms of investment are perfectly subsitutable.
-5 -Both of the countries produce one identical good with the help of capital (K) and labour (L) (of which labour is not internationally mobile).
The current period production in the debtor nation is Yt . Assume that the production utilizes a constant returns to scale -technology. Production per currently young is thus
where f >0,f"<0.
The current period capital stock was determined by the savings decisions of the currently old. Hence, it cannot be affected by the decisions of the currently young. Instead, their decisions determine the capital stock in the next period. The production is organized on the basis of perfect competition. Thus, the gross wage of the currently young is
and the next period capital stock is determined from Capital formation and government borrowing must be financed by the savings of the young and by the foreign borrowing. Or, the capital stock, the outstanding government debt and the foreign debt must be held by the currently young (since the currently old do not save at all). Thus, -6 -where Lt st = At+1 = net private wealth at the beginning of the next period.
In per (t+l)-young terms (6) can be written as (7) a t+l = k t+l + g t+l ~ h t+l
We also have
The government budget constraint is
where (l-l)nt = transfer of foreign income to the government. If 1=1, the foreign income is transferred completely to the currently young in the debtor country (i.e. it is a "poverty relief"). If 1=0, the transfer |it is made completely to the debtor country government (i.e. it can be regarded as a "debt relief").
Finally, the current account deficit in the debtor country (CA) (and in every other country) is equal to the increase in foreign borrowing, CAt = Ht+1 -Ht , or in per young -form: (Notice, that capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the countries. This implies that interest rates are equalized.)
If 1 =1, the transfer (it is completely financed by taxes on the currently young in the creditor country. If 1 =0, the transfer is debt financed. * (Note also that I assume n = n in order to get a steady state where both countries have an impact on the world economy. I also assume that Lt = Lt* for simplicity.)
Since the world as a whole is a closed economy, there cannot exist net private international debt. Thus, the world economy equilibrium condition is that '14') H^ , + FT , =0, for all t+1, or t+1 t+1
This can be written in a more transparent form as
It is easy check, that if (15) holds, then also the goods market clears (and vice versa). Equation (15) is the equation that determines the interest rate rt+1
The equations presented thus far determine the "short run" effects of the transfers. But the long run of steady state effects are also of interest. To study them, one must specify the transfer policy over time and the budgetary policies pursued by the national governments. About the transfers I assume that they are made only in the current period, \i t > 0, (i t+1 = n t+1 = 0, i=l,2,... . About the budgetary policies I assume that the governments stabilize the per capita level of debt after the transfer. This is a standard assumption used in the literature (see e.g. Persson (1985) and the references given there), but in the present context (I refer to current events in both the DCs and LDC's) this may be the most reasonable assumption (at least normatively). Hence, the taxes B t+1 are determined by B t+1 = (r t+1 ,-n)g t+1 , and so on. Analogues equation holds for the creditor nation. The steady state equations can now be given for the debtor nation as
s = s(w,r),
tb = -(r-n)h.
The steady state of the creditor nation can be given in similar equations.
The steady state world equilibrium condition is:
[l/(l+n)]{s(w,r) + s (w ,r)}.
III THE EFFECTS OF TRANSFERS
The model allows the study of four types of transfers. They are:
tax-financed "poverty relief", debt-financed "debt-relief", tax-financed debt-relief, and debt-financed poverty relief. The first of these comes closest to the transfer usually considered in the literature. Hence, it provides a convenient starting point.
1° Tax-Financed Income Transfers
This transfer can be analyzed by setting 1=1 in equations (5) and (9), and 1 =1 in equations (12) and (13). Since equation (4) (and its equivalent for the creditor country) determines kt+1 as a declining function of rt+1 , kt+1 , =k(rt+1), k'<0, (and kt+1 , = k (rt+1 ), (k )'<0), the current equilibrium rate of interest can be solved from equation (15) the transfer is given by accordingly independent of rt+1 . Thus the equilibrium change in rt+1 due to
Since the coefficient of drt+1 is negative, the effect of the transfer depends on the sign of (sw -sw ). If the saving propensity in the creditor country is higher than in the debtor nation, this term will be negative.
-10 -Because one reason why the other country is a creditor nation is that it has a higher saving propensity, it is reasonable to assume that The effect of the transfer on the current account of the debtor nation
, -s n, r t+1 w which is negative: the deficit declines, and, consequently, the current account surplus in the creditor country is reduced. The effect on the trade balance deficit of the debtor country is
which cannot be signed unambiguously. The real transfer is effected, i.e.
the trade balance deficit increases, if the saving propensity in the debtor country is very low (so that most of the transfer is spent immediately), arc if the saving propensity in the creditor nation is not "too large" (so that the rate of interest does not increase much).
Finally, the short run welfare effects of the income transfer must be considered. First, the welfare of the currently (period t) old in either country is not at all affected, since their income is not affected by the transfer. The welfare of the young in the debtor country increases -11 -unambiguously, since their welfare is given by u t = V(w t ,r t+1 , ), V ,V >0, and now dw t =(j t >0, dr t+1 -,>0. The effect on the welfare of the young in the creditor nation is # *• * * dui = 7 dw,_ + V dr . , t w t r t+1
with dw t =-^-t and dr t+1 as given above. Since V (and V also) satisfies all the properties of the indirect utility function, Roy's identity obtains the following form: abroad, ht+1 , =0, the welfare of the young in the creditor nation necessarily t+1 declines, when the economy is stable. This is the standard result in the trade theory, and the result here is completely analogous, since in the static trade theory current account deficits or surpluses are not allowed.
(For the results in the static trade theory, see e.g. woodland (1982),ch.10.) But since ht+1 " <0 in the creditor nation, the welfare loss is t+1 not inevitable. The intuition is that the increase in the interest rate may increase the income from foreign lending to such an extent that the negative effects of the transfer are overcome. This result (though unlikely) contrasts with the results derived from more traditional models. Below it is shown that the contrast is stronger for other types of transfers.
Furthermore, the world welfare, as measured by the sum of the utilities in money terms, increases, for
The world as a whole is a net saver, and thus, it benefits from the increase in the interest rate.
In the next period, period t+1, there are no direct transfers, ut+1 =O.
But the transfer made in the previous period has still an impact. First, the stabilization of per capita debts implies that the national taxes are set by 
2" The Debt-Financed Debt-Relief
The effects of a transfer of income from the creditor country which is financed by government borrowing and which is used to reduce the government debt in the debtor nation, can be found by using the parametrization 1=1 =0.
Thus, the levels of government debt are changed by dgt+1 = -nt /(1+n) = -dgt+1 . Since this transfer does not directly affect the current net wages in either country, it does not have any effect on the current rate of interest, i.e. drt+1 /\i = 0 (see equation (15)). Hence, all levels of welfare also remain unchanged in the current period. Only the current accounts are affected: the current account deficit of the debtor nation is reduced exactly by the extent of the transfer. There is no effect on current trade balances. But the situation changes completely in the next period, period t+1, since the altered levels of government debts have implications for national taxes. In fact, effects of the debt-financed debt-relief are exactly like the impact effects of a tax-financed income transfer just studied in 1°. The pure debt transfer is thus transformed into a pure income transfer. Hence the analysis of section 1° can be directly repeated here for period t+1. But this equivalence between temporary pure debt transfers and temporary pure income transfers holds only for this single period, since the reallocation of debt has an impact on all periods and on the steady state also. The temporary pure debt transfer is equivalent to a permanent pure income transfer.
The long run effects of the pure debt transfer can be most conveniently found by analyzing the steady state effects. The steady state national taxes change by: dS = gdr+(r-n)dg, dB = g dr+rdg , dg . Hence, the net wage incomes change by
Thus, the equilibrium change in the steady state interest rate is (as:
derived from equation (27)):
Since A-B > 0 (by stability), the steady state interest rate increases because of the transfer, dr/n >0. The transfer shifts the income from a country with high saving propensity to a country with low saving propersity.
Hence, the net saving in the world declines. Since the level of the net government debt is unchanged, the reduction in saving must be effected through a decline in capital formation.
The effect on the debtor country current account deficit is
-15 -Thus, if sr -(l+n)k'-s (k+g)>0, which is the stability condition for the autarkic nation, then the current account deficit of the debtor nation is reduced in the long run. Since the trade balance deficit is equal to -(r-n)h (i.e. the debtor country trade balance shows surplus in the steady state), the transfer will increase it (i.e. the trade surplus will grow).
The lifetime welfare of a citizen in the debtor country changes by du/'V = dw + (V /V )dr. w r w
Roy's identity says that V ,'V =: s/(l+r) = (l+n)(k+g-h)/(l+r). r w
Hence, du/V^ == [ -(r-n)(k+g)-CUn)h]dr/(l+r) + (r-n)n t /(l+n) •
Since r>n (by assumption) the first term in this sum is negative and the second is positive (because dr>0). The first term catches the effect of increased interest rate on gross wage, on taxes, and on the interest on foreign debt. The positive term is due to the reduction in taxes made possible by the reduction in the level of the debtor counry public debt. The net effect of the transfer on the steady state welfare is thus ambiguous.
And it is indeed possible that the welfare is reduced (as this possibility cannot be ruled out by the stability condition). Thus, the transfer increases the welfare in the debtor country in the short run, but may lead to a reduction in the long run well-being. In the creditor country the steady state welfare changes by du*/V w = [-(r-n)(k*+g*)-(l+n)h*]dr/(l+r) -(r-n)|i /(1+n).
Since h <0, the sign of this expression is also ambiguous. If h =0, it would be negative, but in general there is no way to claim that the welfare is reduced, since the interest income from foreign lending may be sufficiently high. Hence, it is possible that in the long run the transfer leads to a reduction of welfare in the country receiving the transfer and to an -16 -improvement in well-being in the country which makes the transfer. But it is also easily seen that the net world welfare declines in the long run i.e. du/V + du /V < 0. w w Hence, it is also possible that both countries loose in the long run. This again contrasts with the short run effects.
3° Tax -17 -
The short run welfare effects of the transfer are easily stated. For the debtor country the only effect is on the welfare of the young, which declines due to the decline in the rate of interest. Thus, the transfer leads to reduced welfare. Besides by the decline in the interest rate the welfare of the young is in the creditor country adversely affected also by the increase in taxes. Thus, in the short run welfare is reduced in both of the countries.
Consider then the steady state effects of the transfer. The steady state net wages change by
Thus, the rate of interest changes by
The world net savings are increased by the decline in debtor country government debt and by the increase in debtor country private income created by tax reduction (made possible by the reduction in debt). This increase in seving has to find its home in increased capital formation.
The steady state current account surplus of the creditor nation changes by * *****
Since the countries as autarkic are assumed to be stable the term in * brackets is negative. Hence, -dca <0, i.e. the creditor country current account surplus decreases, and thus necessarily the debtor country current account deficit is reduced. 
*
This cannot be signed unambiguously, since h <0. If h is "small", then the loss of interest income from foreign lending is not large, and the creditorcountry welfare also increases. But the possibility of welfare reduction cannot be ruled out if h is "large". At any rate, the "world welfare" is increased by the transfer.
The present type of transfer can be contrasted with those studied earlier. First, it is the only transfer that guarantees that the welfare of the debtor nation increases in the long run, but it is also the only type of transfer that makes the debtor country welfare decline in the short run.
Also, it is the only type of transfer that makes the interest rate decline, and thus increases real growth.
4° Debt-Financed Poverty Relief
The remaining form of transfer to be studied is the one where the transfer is given to the young of the debtor nation and which is financed by an increase in creditor country public debt. This can be studied by using Since the direct impact of the present transfer on the country receiving it is temporary, its long run effects are the same as the effects of the intertemporal income transfer analyzed by Persson (1985) . The steady state welfare in the debtor nation changes by
Since h>0 and dr>0 (as is easily checked), it is clear that the debtor country welfare is reduced in the long run. In the creditor country
* Since h <0, this cannot be signed unambiguously, though again with "small" h the welfare is reduced. The "world welfare" is, however, unambiguously reduced.
Hence, of all the transfers studied in this essay this last one appears to be the most doubtful from the welfare point of view. It is the only transfer which unambiguously leads to reduced welfare in the debtor nation in the long run. But it must be remembered that the short run effects are beneficial for all the countries.
IV THE EFFECT OF TRANSFERS TIED TO THE LEVEL OF DEBT OR TO THE LEVEL OF CREDITOR INCOME
In the previous section the size of the transfer was unrelated to the level of international indebtedness. Here I shall study permanent transfers of the form ut = zht for all t, where z, 0<z<l determines the size of the transfer. I assume that the transfer is tax-financed and is given as an income transfer. The effect on the steady state welfare in the debtor nation is
Again, this cannot be signed unambiguously.
Hence, one can conclude that the effect of tied transfers do not differ qualitatively from the effects on untied transfers studied in section III.
This holds also, if the transfer is tied to the level of income in the creditor nation. This type of tie has been recommended e.g. gy the U.N. In the present model this could be modelled with the specification * V-+.
= zw t > 0<z<l.
V CONCLUSIONS
The analysis leads to following points:
1) The form of the international transfers matters very much for both their short run and long run effects.
Assuming that the saving propensity in the debtor nation (which receives the transfer) is smaller than in the creditor nation (which makes the transfer) the following results hold:
2) All other forms of transfers except the tax-financed debt-reliefs make the world interest rate increase in the short run (or have no effect like the debt-financed debt-relief). With tax-financed debt-reliefs the interest rate declines. 5) The same taxonomy that applies to interest rate effects applies also to welfare effects. In the short run all other transfers except the tax-financed debt-relief make the debtor country welfare increase. In case of tax-financed debt-relief the debtor country welfare declines. But the long run effects are just the opposite. The only form of transfer that unambiguously makes the debtor country welfare increase is the tax-financed debt-relief. With debt-financed poverty-relief the debtor nation welfare necessarily declines, and for all other types of transfers the effect is negative. It thus appears that there is a trade-off between short and long run welfare benefits.
6) The welfare effects on the country making the transfer are also of interest. In contrast to the results of the static trade theory, the impact of the transfer on the welfare of the transferring country can be in the same direction as for the country receiving the transfer. Thus, the tax-financed income transfer can (in the short run improve the welfare in both of the countries. This possibility cannot be ruled out by stability arguments. This discrepancy in results can be explained, when one remembers that in the static trade theory no net foreign borrowing is allowed, whereas here foreign indebtedness and the interest rate effects on foreign loans are the crux of the analysis.
-23 -
7)
All forms of transfers share the property that the current account deficit of the country receiving the transfer is reduced both in the short run and in the long run (except for tax-financed property reliefs, which do not have any long run effects).
Finally, one must remember that the analysis conducted here is based on very simple assumptions. Especially important are the omissions of all strategic considerations, which certainly have an impact on international transfers. Hamada (1985) has provided an interesting strategic analysis of fiscal policies within the overlapping generations model. Similar thoughts can most certainly be applied to the problem of international transfers.
